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what effects this derivatives usage has on the foreign exchange risk exposure of 471 European non-
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show furthermore that European firms use FCDs to hedge – and not to speculate –.  The statistically weak 
effects these hedging strategies have on firms’ currency exposures reveal, however, that European 
companies are hedging only a small proportion of the currency risk they are facing.   
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 2 
Introduction 
Today all firms are facing various sources of exchange rate risk in exercising their daily 
activities. In this context, financial derivative contracts – such as forwards, swaps and 
options – provide managers with a whole series of instruments to manage these risks. 
However, the question whether companies should or should not implement hedging 
strategies to reduce their foreign currency exposure is still going on. While the 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm postulates that the financial risk management 
activities of a company are irrelevant to shareholder wealth since shareholders have 
access to the same risk management tools as corporate managers, more recent theories 
suggest that hedging activities could be value-increasing. Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz 
(1985), DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), Froot et al. (1993), Nance et al. (1993), Mian 
(1996), Tufano (1996), and Geczy et al. (1997) among others have conducted research on 
potential hypothetical rationales for corporate risk management. They provide useful 
information on numerous valid reasons why companies should consider hedging to 
maximize shareholder wealth. As firms didn’t reveal their position in derivatives until the 
1990s, the empirical validation of these theories has, however, been confronted with the 
long-lasting unavailability of reliable data on hedging activities. Since then, widespread 
corporate use of derivatives has been documented in Dolde (1993), Bodnar et al. (1998), 
Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Berkman et al. (1997), Henstchel and Kothari (2001), and 
Bodnar et al. (2003). A recent stream of research has also sought to identify which 
hedging theories best describe a firm’s choice to use financial hedging instruments (e.g., 
Nance et al., 1993; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Joseph, 2000). More recent studies (e.g., 
Geczy et al., 1997; Marshall, 2000; Judge, 2004) have even differentiated between 
different types of risks (e.g. interest rate, currency, commodity) suggesting that factors 
determining derivatives usage may differ for each type.  
Since reasons to hedge may exist to either decrease or increase risk exposure, the 
expected effect of financial hedging instruments is primarily an empirical issue. However 
if we assume that the objectives of corporate derivative usage are to reduce firms’ foreign 
exchange risk, the question emerges whether these activities may constitute one possible 
explanation for the fact that empirical research has found limited evidence of a significant 
link between exchange rates movements and firm value (see, e.g., Jorion, 1990; Amihud, 
1994; Bodnar and Gentry, 1993). This argument has first been supported by Bartov and 
Bodnar (1994) who affirm that firms are aware of their currency exposures and 
efficiently manage it.1 Analyzing the impact of currency fluctuations on U.S., Japanese 
                                                 
1
 See Loderer and Pichler (2000) for a discussion on firms’ awareness of their foreign exchange risk 
exposure. 
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and Canadian industries, Bodnar and Gentry (1993) likewise suggest that the reported 
effect of exchange rates on industry returns is insignificant because companies are using 
various hedging instruments to hedge their exposure. The difficulty of quantifying the 
importance of hedging activities doesn’t enable them however to test for the impact of 
these presumed hedging activities. Similarly acknowledging the impact of hedging 
activities on exchange rate exposure, several other studies (He and Ng, 1998; Chow and 
Chen, 1998) examine the relationship between variables that proxy firms’ incentives to 
hedge and estimated exchange rate exposures. Their results suggest that firms with high 
leverage and low liquidity – thus, having more incentives to hedge – are nevertheless 
more sensitive to currency fluctuations.  
Up till now, the direct interdependence between actual firms’ risk management 
strategies and their risk exposures has not received much attention in the literature. 
Notable exceptions are provided in Simkins and Laux (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek 
(2001). While the former find no statistically significant impact of foreign currency 
derivative usage on exposure, the latter suggest that a firm’s use of derivatives tends to 
reduce its exchange risk exposure. In a different context, Pantzalis et al. (2001) show that 
a firm’s capacity to construct operational hedges moderates its sensitivity to currency 
fluctuations. Overall, the evidence is scarce and relatively little is known about the 
impact of corporate hedging activities on firms’ foreign exchange risk exposure – leaving 
many questions unanswered: How widespread is the use of foreign currency derivatives? 
What are the main determinants of FCD usage? Do firms use derivatives to hedge – or to 
speculate? What are the real effects of their hedging strategies? 
Regarding all these questions, this paper has four primary advantages over 
previous studies.  First, it has to be emphasized that until now, continental European non-
financial firms barely disclosed any information on derivative usage. Consequently, there 
is only very limited knowledge about their hedging patterns and motivations. Hardly any 
empirical studies have been able to investigate the determinants of derivatives’ usage in 
continental Europe. With the exception of Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) and De Ceuster et 
al. (2000) who have respectively explored German and Belgian companies, this study is, 
hence, the first extensive analysis on the foreign exchange risk management practices of a 
large sample of German, Dutch, Belgian and U.K. firms.2 Thanks to this new extensive 
data set consisting of 471 European multinationals, we are able to provide not only 
descriptive but also analytical evidence regarding many questions raised in the literature. 
Second, while most studies exploring firms’ hedging incentives employ a dependent 
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 It has to be noted that information on European risk management activities is as well discussed in Bartram 
et al. (2004) who provide large-scale international evidence on derivatives usage for a sample of 7,263 non-
financial firms from 48 countries including the United States. 
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binary variable indicating whether a firm uses FCDs or not, we extend this methodology 
by investigating both the factors that determine a firm’s decision to use FCDs and those 
affecting the level of external hedging activities. Third, as no study thus far has addressed 
the question of whether there is a direct relationship between European non-financial 
firms’ use of FCDs and their currency risk exposure, we fill the existing gap. We 
examine whether FCD users are less exposed to market and exchange rate movements 
than FCD non-users and, specifically verify whether the level and significance of 
measured foreign currency risk exposures reflect the outcomes of financial risk 
management activities. Following Allayannis and Ofek (2001), we estimate therefore a 
multivariate regression linking a firm’s exchange rate exposure to both its foreign sales 
ratio and its financial hedging activities. To extend Allayanis and Ofek’s work, we 
include furthermore variables that are proxies for firms’ operational hedging activities as 
well as for firms’ incentives to hedge. Fourth, our analysis examines the impact of FCDs 
both on weekly and on monthly exchange rate exposures. The variation of the time period 
used in estimating the currency exposures gives us not only the possibility to perform 
robustness checks – by examining if our results vary with the exposure horizon – but it 
enables us primarily to evaluate the effectiveness of hedging techniques across different 
time horizons. Many authors (see, e.g., Chow and Chen, 1998; Griffin and Stulz, 2001; 
Dominguez and Tesar, 2001; Di Iorio and Faff, 2001; Muller and Verschoor, 2004) have 
indeed demonstrated that exchange rate exposure becomes increasingly evident when 
lengthening return measurement intervals. We are able, in this paper, to validate – or 
refute – one potential explanation for this horizon-dependent impact of currency 
fluctuations on firm value. A stronger impact of FCD usage on monthly than on weekly 
foreign risk exposures would de facto suggest that longer-term exposures characterize, to 
a larger degree, economic exposures that are unrelated to known transactions and hence 
difficult to hedge.  
 
 The paper is organized as follows. After reviewing our research questions in the 
next section, we describe the sample procedure and data characteristics in section 2. 
Section 3 provides empirical findings on the determinants of hedging while the impact of 
corporate derivative usage on foreign exchange risk exposure is presented in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes.  
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1 Research questions  
1.1   Why do firms hedge? 
Under the classical Modigliani and Miller (1958) paradigm, no financial derivative 
contract can influence firm value. Assuming perfect capital markets, the classical 
Modigliani and Miller paradigm implies thus that firms have no reasons to engage in 
hedging activities since shareholders of the company who wish to mitigate their risk 
exposures always have the possibility to perform the necessary hedging transactions on 
their own. In reality however, capital markets are imperfect and (i) financial distress, (ii) 
taxes, (iii) information asymmetries and (iv) agency problems are costly to firms. Smith 
and Stulz (1985), Bessembinder (1991), Nance et al. (1993) and Froot et al. (1993), 
among others, show why these market imperfections may lead to an increase in firm 
value through hedging activities. It has to be stressed, however, that, while capital market 
imperfections are necessary to justify hedging activities, the existence of sufficiently 
large risk exposures and the costs related to the implementation of these hedging 
programs have as well to be taken into account when ultimately evaluating the impact of 
financial derivative instruments usage on firm value. 
But before analyzing the impact of corporate derivative usage, we will first 
construct the theoretical framework of this study and present hereafter a short and concise 
overview on the most popular hedging theories.3 As already mentioned, most of them 
arrive at optimal hedging policies by introducing some frictions to the classical 
Modigliani and Miller model: 
i. expected cost of financial distress 
In real world, financial obligations that cannot be fully or timely settled due to illiquidity 
cause financial distress and lead to transaction costs (Shapiro and Titman, 1985). By 
reducing the variance of firm value and, with that, the probability that the firm will 
encounter financial distress, hedging can reduce these expected costs of financial distress 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985). As a consequence, firms with high leverage4 and low liquidity 
are expected to have strong incentives to hedge their risky positions. However, as direct 
costs of financial distress have been shown to be less than proportional to firm size5, 
Nance et al. (1993) maintain that smaller firms should hedge more than larger ones. On 
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 This overview provides as well useful insight in the choice of the variables to be used in section 3. 
4
 Dolde (1995) and Haushalter (2000) use the debt ratio to measure expected costs of distress and find that 
hedging increases with the debt ratio. 
5
 See Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) for an analysis of the relationship between firm size and 
financial distress costs. 
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the other hand, one may as well support the point of view that large firms have more 
sophisticated risk management strategies and benefit from scale economies, being thus 
likely to hedge more (Martin and Mauer, 2004). 
ii. taxes 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the structure of the tax code may determine a firm’s 
decision to hedge. They demonstrate that for corporations facing tax-function convexity6, 
hedging lowers expected tax liabilities by reducing the volatility of taxable income. 
Graham and Smith (1999) suggest that, in particular, carrybacks and carryforwards are 
strong incentives to engage in hedging activities while other tax-code provisions have 
minor impacts.7  
iii. information asymmetries 
Corporate risk management activities may also result from managerial incentives based 
on asymmetric information, i.e. managers as opposed to shareholders are better informed 
about the sources and extent of risk faced by the firm. While De Marzo and Duffie (1995) 
argue that firms are sometimes hedging based on private information that cannot be 
costlessly conveyed to shareholders, Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) claim that 
managers have incentives to hedge away uncertainty about future performance to 
influence the market’s judgement about their management ability. Whatever justification 
preferred, shareholders in both situations may benefit from corporate hedging through the 
reduction of firms’ profit variability and shareholders’ noise perception in the 
information set regarding unobservable risks. Hence, the more the management of the 
firm possesses proprietary information, the more corporate hedging may be beneficial to 
shareholder wealth (De Marzo and Duffie, 1995). 
iv. agency problems 
Conflicts of interest between bondholders and shareholders give rise to underinvestment 
problems as residual claimholders may have the incentive not to realize all investment 
opportunities with positive net present values if the gains accrue primarily to fixed 
claimholders. Hedging mitigates this underinvestment problem because it redistributes 
cash from states in which cash flow exceeds fixed obligations to states with insufficient 
cash flow. The value of the debt becomes thus less sensitive to incremental investment 
decisions (Bessembinder, 1991). On the other hand, Froot et al. (1993) argue that by 
shifting internal funds into states where they would otherwise be scarce, hedging permits 
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 Graham and Smith (1999) show that the firms that are most likely to have convex tax functions are small 
firms which have expected income near zero and alternate between profits and losses. 
7
 Graham and Rogers (2002) find no empirical evidence that companies hedge in response to tax convexity. 
 7 
the company to engage in valuable investment projects with cheaper funds. In both cases, 
we predict that a firm’s hedging activities should be positively related to proxies of 
potential underinvestment costs, i.e. leverage and growth opportunities. Nance et al. 
(1993) suggest, however, that firms have still the possibility to reduce the conflict 
between shareholders and bondholders by means other than hedging with financial 
instruments. They may, e.g., issue convertible bonds or preferred stocks.  
Agency costs may as well emerge because managers act on behalf of their goals. 
As already mentioned above, managers may not be able to diversify away risks as they 
have an extremely undiversified wealth position resulting from their employment in the 
firm, the related current and futures incomes, and associated factors such as reputation 
and awards (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Bartram, 2002). Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate 
that the expected utility of wealth of risk-avers managers with large ownerships in the 
firm are significantly affected when expected profits are volatile.8 As a result, managers 
with large firm ownerships have strong incentives to persuade the firm to engage in 
hedging activities.9  
To conclude, it has to be emphasized that, in general, the presence of hedging 
substitutes is expected to reduce the need for hedging. Low dividend yields10 and high 
liquidity ratios may, as an illustration, enable the firm to retain sufficient liquidity to 
make corporate hedging useless.11 More specifically, when analyzing the use of foreign 
currency derivatives, the relative importance of foreign sales relative to total sales and the 
geographical dispersion of foreign operations have as well to be taken into consideration. 
From an empirical point of view, earlier studies have examined the consistency 
between optimal hedging theories and derivatives usage in general (see, e.g., Nance et al., 
1993; Dolde, 1993; Mian, 1996; Pennings and Garcia, 2004). More recent studies tend to 
acknowledge, however, that factors determining derivatives usage may differ for each 
type of hedging (see, e.g., Tufano, 1996; Haushalter, 2000; Gezcy et al., 1997; 
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 Assuming no hedging costs, corporate hedging activities should hence increase managers’ utility without 
reducing firm value. Froot et al. (1993) criticize, however, the argumentation of Smith and Stulz (1985) as 
it relies as well on the assumption that managers’ personal hedging activities are very costly and leads to 
the conclusion that, without the introduction of transaction costs of hedging at the firm level, firms should 
hedge as much as possible, i.e. to minimize the stock price variance.   
9
 Consistent with the argumentation of Smith and Stulz (1985), Tufano (1996) and Schrand and Unal 
(1998) find evidence that hedging increases with managerial shareholdings and decreases with managerial 
option ownership. Other studies (see, e.g., Geczy et al., 1997 and Haushalter, 2000) find, however, no 
evidence that managerial risk aversion or shareholdings affect corporate hedging. 
10
 As dividend yields proxy dividend restrictions as well as growth opportunities, the sign of the 
relationship between dividend yields and derivatives usage is theoretically difficult to predict. 
11
 Low dividend yields (Nance et al., 1993) and high quick ratios (Tufano, 1996; Minton and Schrand, 
1999) have been shown to be empirically negatively related to derivatives usage. 
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Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Judge, 2004; Bartram et al., 2004).12 Tufano’s (1996) 
empirical findings on the use of commodity derivatives in the gold mining industry lend 
support to theories of managerial risk aversion, while the hypothesis that expected 
financial costs provide an incentive to hedge is confirmed in Haushalter (2000) and in 
Visvanathan (1998). Geczy et al. (1997) investigate the relation between the likelihood 
that a firm uses FCDs, proxies for incentives to hedge as well as proxies for foreign 
exchange exposure among U.S. non-financial firms.13 Their findings suggest that the use 
of FCDs depends on a firm’s degree of foreign sales, foreign trade and size. Consistent 
with the notion that hedging is used to mitigate the underinvestment problem, the amount 
of R&D expenditures is as well found to be an important determinant of hedging. 
However no clear relation between foreign debt and derivatives usage could be 
established. Judge (2004) explores the determinants of the decision to hedge among U.K. 
non-financial firms. Consistent with previous reported results, his findings ascribe strong 
explanatory power to firm size and the foreign currency transactions dummy, thus 
providing support for the economies of scale and exchange exposure hypotheses. Judge 
finds, moreover, proxy variables for the financial distress argument to be similarly 
significant in explaining FCD use. Conversely, Bartram et al. (2004) who investigate the 
use of currency, interest and commodity derivatives by non-financial firms from 48 
countries come to the conclusion that none of the afore-mentioned hedging theories are 
clearly supported by the data. Recent studies exploring the determinants of hedging 
intensity based on continuous measures of corporate derivative usage lead to similar 
results. Howton and Perfect (1998), for instance, find that derivatives use is unrelated to 
most of the proxies for the theoretical hedging determinants.14 
1.2 Does corporate derivative usage influence foreign exchange risk 
exposure? 
If market imperfections – like those outlined in the previous section – exist, theory 
expects that the more derivatives a firm uses to hedge its exposures, the less risk exposure 
it will face. As a consequence the relationship between a firm‘s riskiness and its foreign 
currency derivative usage should be negative. This anticipation is nevertheless based on 
the assumption that FCDs are exclusively used for hedging while existing theories 
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 For a general overview on corporate derivative practices, we recommend the papers by Bodnar et al. 
(1998), Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999), De Ceuster et al. (2000), Marshall (2000), Guay and Kothari (2003), 
Bodnar et al. (2003), Bartram et al. (2004).  
13
 Geczy et al. (1997) empirically investigate what factors influence the decision to hedge using a logit 
regression. 
14
 The lack of link between derivatives use and theoretical hedging determinants is most apparent for 
currency contracts (Howton and Perfect, 1998). 
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suggest that firms might also use derivatives to take on additional risks.15 As a 
consequence, the question whether FCD usage decreases – or increases – a firm’s risk 
exposures remains unsolved. 
Thus far, limited empirical evidence has been brought to answer this question for 
non-financial firms. In large part, the lack of evidence is attributable to poor data 
availability. Among recent papers, Guay (1999) uses an event-study approach and finds a 
statistically significant decrease in firm risk exposure, measured by interest rate and 
exchange rate exposures, following the initiation of derivatives usage.16 In contrast, 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) find that firms who hedge their exposures with derivative 
positions display few, if any, measurable differences in risk compared to firms that do not 
use financial derivatives. The analysis of 7,263 non-financial firms from 48 countries by 
Bartram et al. (2004) reveals some support for a positive value effect of general 
derivatives use but only for firms without exposure. The impact of FCD use, however, is 
found to be insignificant. Marshall (2000) empirically shows, furthermore, that contrary 
to the general view found in the literature derivatives use doesn’t always decrease the 
variability of the firm’s value and that the degree of usage of certain techniques is even  
associated with an increase in the variability of certain financial measures. 
Focusing on the use foreign currency derivatives in a sample of 720 large U.S. 
multinationals, Allayannis and Weston (2001) find a positive relation between firm value 
and the use of FCDs. The hedging premium is statistically and economically significant 
for firms with exposure to exchange rates and is on average 4.87 percent of firm value. 
Using a similar methodology, Pramborg (2004) shows that for Swedish companies 
transaction exposure hedging seems to add value while there is no positive value effect 
from translation exposure hedging. Empirical evidence on the relation between a firm’s 
currency hedging activities and its exchange risk exposure is provided in Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001) and Nguyen and Faff (2003). Whereas the former tend to suggest that firms 
use currency derivatives mainly for hedging – as their use tends to reduce the foreign 
exchange risk exposure firms face –, the latter find that the impact of FCD usage on 
exchange rate exposure is generally weak and lacks consistency. Moreover Nguyen and 
Faff fail to document any relationship between the use of FCDs and long horizon 
exposure. This last finding may lend support to the hypothesis formulated in the 
introduction according to which horizon exposure captures economic exposure which is 
difficult to hedge with financial derivatives. 
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 An owner of a leveraged firm can, for instance, have incentives to increase the firm’s riskiness in order to 
transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) 
16
 It has to be underlined that this study is limited to new FCD users only. 
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2. Data 
This study analyses as of year-end 2003 the determinants of corporate FCD usage and its 
role in reducing foreign exchange risk exposure for European non-financial firms 
established in 4 distinctive sample countries: the U.K, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. The selection procedure for the sample used in this study encompasses 5 steps. 
First the constituents of the FTSE 350, the AEX, the DAX and the BEL 20 are 
identified.17 Next, foreign firms, i.e. firms that do not have their headquarters in the U.K, 
Germany, the Netherlands or Belgium are excluded from the sample. Since financial 
firms’ business nature causes them to use foreign currency derivatives also for purposes 
other than hedging, they are as well excluded. As we are interested in the attitude of 
corporations to foreign exchange risk, firms that are most likely to be exposed to these 
risks are considered. We therefore investigate whether firms included in the sample have 
international linkages. As exposures are most obvious for firms that sell abroad through 
foreign subsidiaries or export operations, reported foreign sales as provided in the notes 
to the financial statements, are taken as proxies for foreign operations.18 Moreover, 
whenever a firm discloses any other type of information on foreign operations or 
currency risk in the operational and financial review of its annual report, we include it in 
the sample. All the final sample-firms meet at least one of the above-mentioned criteria. 
In a final step, only firms that have at least 2 consecutive years of weekly stock return 
data in the Datastream International database between January 2002 and October 2004 
are included. The selection procedure provides thus an ultimate sample of 471 European 
non-financial firms. Weekly and monthly stock price series of individual companies are 
obtained from Datastream International.  
In addition to stock return data, two economic factors are employed when 
estimating the foreign exchange risk exposure of the sample companies. The proxies used 
for the market factor are either national Datastream calculated total market return indices 
or the European Datastream calculated total market return index as provided by 
Datastream International. The exchange rates are respectively the effective euro 
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 All firms that are included in these indices are listed and stock price movements are provided by 
Datastream International. 
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 Firms may also be sensitive to exchange rate movements when utilizing imported inputs with prices that 
are influenced by currency fluctuations. They are however only required to disclose information on foreign 
revenues and don’t report useful information on foreign expenses. Consequently, we concentrate in this 
paper on the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and assume it to be a reasonable proxy of a firm’s 
international trading involvement.  
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exchange rate index19 of the ECB, the effective U.K. pound exchange rate index of the 
Bank of England and the WMR bilateral euro, respectively U.K. pound exchange rates 
towards the U.S. dollar.20 The sample period covers the period January 2002 to October 
2004.21   
A thorough analysis of the 2003 annual reports enables us to collect data on 
foreign operations and hedging practices of the 471 European non-financial firms. 
Information on notional as well as fair values of currency hedging positions is sourced 
from the notes to the annual accounts. As we do not restrict the definition of currency 
hedging to FCD usage, qualitative and / or quantitative data on any other type of currency 
risk management activity is as well investigated in financial reports, operational reports, 
footnotes and notes to the annual accounts. Finally, information on variables that are used 
in section 4 to proxy hedging incentives is likewise obtained from the annual reports.   
Panel A of table 1 presents an overview on the balance sheet characteristics as 
well as the annual reports disclosures of foreign operations of Belgian, Dutch and 
German non-financial firms included in our sample. Out of these 335 firms, 223 (66.6 
percent) report the use of FCDs.22 If we compare companies that use FCDs with 
companies that don’t, we note that FCD users tend to be larger in terms of size23, total 
assets and employees. This finding is in line with the existence of fixed costs related to 
FCD hedging that act as a barrier to hedging for small firms. Consistent with the financial 
distress motives to hedge, we observe moreover that debt ratios of FCD hedgers exhibit 
higher values. However, in contrast to the underinvestment hypothesis (Froot et al., 1993; 
Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Graham and Rogers, 2000), the observations for the book 
to market variable tend to suggest that firms that have more investment opportunities use 
less derivative instruments. Regarding their foreign involvement, approximately 80 
percent of the firms in our sample provide precise information on the volume of foreign 
sales.24 Among these firms foreign sales account on average for approximately 34 percent 
of total sales for FCD users while these sales represent on average only 14 percent of 
total sales for FCD non-users. The exposure to foreign currency movements through 
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 The effective U.K. pound (euro) exchange rate index is calculated by geometrically weighting together 
bilateral exchange rates against sterling for 21 (23) currencies where each currency is given a 
competitiveness weight reflecting that currency’s relative importance in U.K. (EU) trade. 
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 All exchange rate series are measured in terms of foreign currency price per unit of domestic currency. 
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 A 34-month return period surrounding the disclosure year 2003 is assumed to provide a good basis to 
analyze the contemporaneous impact of FCD use on sample firms’ foreign currency exposure. 
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 Among all derivative instruments, forwards appear to be the most intensively used by our sample firms. 
This observation is consistent with previous empirical findings (Bodnar et al., 1998, Bartram et al., 2004). 
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 Size is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of total debt. 
24
 When precise information on the volume of foreign sales isn’t provided in firms’ annual reports, we 
consider these variables as missing and don’t assume them to be zero. 
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foreign sales and trade seems thus to be an important factor explaining the use of FCDs. 
Usable information on the volume of foreign debt is only disclosed by 94 companies in 
the Belgian, Dutch and German firm sample. The ratios of volume of foreign debt to size 
appear to be larger for firms that use financial derivative instruments. 
Equivalent information on U.K. companies is displayed in Panel B of table 1. 
Overall observations are in agreement with those reported above. However, in contrast to 
panel A, only 3 out of 136 U.K. firms do not declare the use of foreign currency 
derivatives.25 U.K. companies seem moreover to rely on a higher degree of overseas 
business and to have stronger international linkages than Belgian, Dutch and German 
companies.26 Among FCD hedgers foreign sales amount on average to roughly 60 
percent of total sales whereas this percentage approximates 30 percent on average for 
FCD non-users.27 The ratio of foreign debt to size is similarly higher for FCD hedgers 
compared to companies that don’t use FCDs. 
 
2. Empirical evidence on the factors determining corporate foreign 
derivative usage 
Consistent with Allayannis and Ofek (2001), we examine the decision and the level of 
FCD usage in a two-step procedure originally suggested by Cragg (1971). We explain 
thus separately the firm’s choice to hedge using FCDs – or not – and the firm’s decision 
of how much to hedge with these instruments.28 
 To model the decision to hedge – or not – we use a binary measure of FCD usage. 
Companies that use FCDs are assigned a value of 1 while all other firms are assigned a 
value of zero. Variables that have been found to make cash flow volatility costly for 
companies (see, e.g., Geczy et al., 1997; Schrand and Unal, 1998) are chosen to explain 
the decision or not to use FCDs. Specifically, to test theories of hedging related to 
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 These findings are consistent with Marshall’s (2000) observations on hedging practices of U.K. firms. He 
noted indeed that a high proportion of U.K. firms that responded to his questionnaire ranked foreign 
exchange risk management as significantly important or most important. 
26
 Almost all U.K. firms included in our sample disclose precise information on their volume of foreign 
sales and foreign debt.  
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 Compared to the values reported for Belgian, Dutch and German firms, the higher values exhibited by 
the ratio of foreign sales to total sales for U.K. firms may be due to the fact that for U.K. firms foreign sales 
correspond to sales outside of the U.K. whereas for Belgian, Dutch and German firms, foreign sales 
correspond to sales outside of the Euro-zone. 
28
 We presume here that firms use FCDs primarily for hedging purposes - as claimed in their annual 
reports-. This assumption enables us to test the optimal hedging theories described in section 1. However 
the question, whether firms use FCDs for hedging or speculation motives will be empirically tested in 
section 4. 
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financial distress costs motives, we use leverage29 – measured as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets –, the ratio of EBIT to total interest expenses and the ratio of EBIT to total 
assets. Agency costs related incentives to hedge are tested using the ratio of book to 
market value. Firms with lower book to market ratios are expected to have greater 
investment opportunities. These firms are potentially facing higher underinvestment costs 
and are expected, hence, to hedge more. To verify whether liquidity may serve as a 
hedging substitute, we add the quick ratio to our model. Nance et al.’s (1993) argument 
that firms retain dividends to reduce their need to hedge is also considered. The tax 
incentive to hedge is verified by the inclusion of a tax dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the firm has tax-loss carryforwards and 0 otherwise. We test the managerial risk aversion 
hypothesis by the inclusion of a variable that measures the option holdings of CEOs.30,31 
The information asymmetry hypothesis is verified by adding the log of the number of 
analysts that follow the company. The log of the sum of the market value of equity and 
book value of debt is used to proxy firm size. The ratios of foreign sales to total sales as 
well as of total foreign debt to firm size are employed to measure the firm’s international 
linkages. 
The first two columns of table 2 present the results of the binomial probit model 
estimated using all sample-firms. In line with previous studies, we observe that foreign 
involvement, measured as the percentage of foreign sales and size are significantly 
positively related to the decision to use FCDs. These results are in contradiction with the 
bankruptcy costs and informational asymmetries motives to hedge that predict that small 
firms have a greater incentive to hedge. They lend nevertheless support to the existence 
of economies of scale in hedging. These economies of scale facilitate the justification of 
hedging programs when the firm is larger and the volume of foreign activity is 
sufficiently large to justify the costs (Martin and Mauer, 2004). Additionally, the 
significance of the positive tax dummy32 coefficient in model 1 seems to confirm the 
convexity-based tax incentive to hedge. The statistically significant positive coefficient of 
the dividend yield factor indicates moreover that retained dividends may be regarded as a 
substitute for hedging. The 4 last columns of table 2 describe the estimation output when 
                                                 
29
 According to Stulz (1996), Ross (1997) and Leland (1998), leverage and hedging practices may also be 
positively correlated due to the positive effect of hedging on firms’ debt capacity. This increased debt 
capacity may result in an effective increase in leverage, thus increasing interest deductions, decreasing tax 
liabilities and finally increasing firm value.  
30
 CEO’s option holdings are calculated as the ratio of the number of options held by CEOs multiplied by 
the year-end price of the share to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt. 
31
 The share holdings of CEOs have also been considered. Results are weaker but consistent.  
32
 The tax dummy variable is equal to 1 if the firm has tax loss carryforwards, 0 otherwise. 
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additional explanatory variables are progressively added to the model.33 Generally 
speaking, most results of column 1 and 2 are confirmed. Furthermore, the volume of 
foreign debt is found to be a strong incentive to hedge for European firms.34 These results 
are in strong opposition with the expectations described in Geczy et al. (1997) and 
empirical evidence presented on U.S. multinationals by Elliott et al. (2003). They support 
however evidence provided by Fok et al. (1997) that natural hedges – like the use of 
foreign debt for net-exporting firms – complement and don’t substitute for the use of 
FCDs in reducing currency risk.  In model 6, the residuals of the regression of the ratio of 
foreign debt to size against the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and size replace the raw 
ratios of foreign debt to size in order to avoid the multicolinearity problems arising 
between these variables. The contemporaneous inclusion of all three variables enables us 
to identify among these variables the stronger incentives to hedge. Results suggest that 
the decision to use FCDs depends more on the percentage of foreign sales and the size of 
the firm than on the importance of foreign debt. In contrast to previous models, model 6 
confirms moreover the financial distress hypothesis. Highly leveraged firms are shown to 
be significantly more inclined to hedge. In contrast, no evidence is found in support of 
liquidity acting as a hedging substitute. Similarly, the ratio of EBIT to total assets, the 
number of analysts and the options held by CEOs are found to have no influence on 
firms’ decision to use financial derivative instruments. 
The determinants of the extent of FCD usage are obtained by estimating a 
regression where we use the relative importance of the total notional value of FCD 
contracts to firms’ total assets as dependent variable.35 The sample is restricted to 
European non-financial firms that do use FCD contracts and provide useful information 
on the notional values of their foreign currency derivative holdings (290 firms36). In line 
with our results of table 2, the first 2 columns of table 3 reveal that international trade 
linkages - approximated by the ratio of foreign sales to total sales – and size are 
significantly positively related to the level of FCD usage. We note however that empirical 
findings reject the hypothesis that firms with more growth options in their investment 
                                                 
33
 Due to the strong correlation between some explanatory variables the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables may require the exclusion of previously incorporated explanatory variables. 
34
 A priori, foreign debt may be regarded as an operational hedging strategy for net exporting firms. In 
contrast foreign debt emphasizes the foreign currency risks importing firms are facing.  
35
 As stressed in Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and Graham and Rogers (2000), the fact that firms net 
positions in individual currencies before disclosing them in the notes of their annual reports may introduce 
a bias in our measurement of the total notional values of the derivative contracts. However, we believe that 
our observations nevertheless provide valuable insights in the hedging practices of our sample firms.  
36
 66 firms of our sample state in their annual report that they use FCDs for hedging purposes but don’t 
disclose the notional values of the FCD contracts. These values are either aggregated with other derivative 
holdings (e.g. interest rate swaps, commodity derivatives) or missing. 
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opportunity set – approximated by firms with low book to market ratios – suffer more 
from underinvestment costs and hedge more. To test in how far a convex tax schedule 
determines the hedging practices of European firms, the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to 
total assets is also included in the regression model. The significance of the positive tax 
coefficient strongly confirms the convexity-based tax incentive to hedge. Consistent with 
the financial distress costs motives to hedge, we find furthermore that less profitable 
firms are more inclined to use FCDs than highly profitable ones. Results obtained 
through the progressive inclusion of additional explanatory variables in our model don’t 
contradict those reported in columns 1 and 2.37 As expected, we observe in model 4, 5 
and 6 that the volume of foreign debt strongly determines the extent of FCD hedging by 
European firms.38 In addition, the extent of FCD usage is shown to be negatively related 
to liquidity which is consistent with liquidity serving as a hedging substitute. We find 
however no evidence that retained dividends could similarly serve as a hedging 
substitute. Similarly, neither the information asymmetry nor the managerial risk aversion 
hypothesis aren’t empirically confirmed. While the positive sign of the debt ratio 
coefficient is consistent with financial distress costs related incentives to hedge, evidence 
in support of this hypothesis is overall statistically weak. These results are in line with 
Graham and Rogers (2000) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001). 
 
4. Empirical evidence on the impact of corporate derivative usage on 
foreign exchange risk exposure 
Following the extensive literature on foreign exchange rate exposure39, we estimate the 
firm-specific foreign exchange risk exposure – defined as the effect of exchange rate 
changes on the value of a firm in excess of the global market’s reaction to foreign 
exchange rate movements – with the following augmented market model: 
 
Rit = i + i Rmt + i Xt +  it                                              (1)  
 
where Rit designates the total return of firm i in period t, Rmt the Datastream calculated 
European total market index return in period t, i firm i’s return sensitivity to market 
                                                 
37
 Due to the strong correlation between some explanatory varaiables the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables may require the exclusion of previously incorporated explanatory variables. 
38
 For model 6, the ratio of foreign debt to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt is 
first regressed to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and to the log of  the sum of the market value of 
equity and book value of debt. The residuals of this regression are consecutively included in model 6. 
39
 See for instance the pioneer studies by Adler and Dumas (1984) and Jorion (1990). 
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fluctuations, Xt the rate of return on the trade-weighted effective euro (U.K. pound) 
exchange rate index – measured as the foreign currencies’ exchange price of one euro 
(respectively one U.K. pound) –,i firm i’s exposure to this exchange rate index 
independent of the effect these variations have on the overall market, and it denotes the 
white noise error term.40 Given the definition of our exchange risk factor, a positive 
exchange rate movement corresponds to an appreciation of the domestic currency (euro 
or U.K. pound). As we expect exporters to be hurt by an appreciation of their home-
currency and importers to benefit from a similar positive exchange rate change, the i 
coefficient should be negative for net-exporters and positive for net-importers.41 
Equivalently, if a firm has net exposed foreign denominated assets, it should suffer from 
a strengthening home currency, producing a negative exposure effect (i.e., the stock 
return should decrease in response to a positive exchange rate movement). On the 
opposite, if a firm has net exposed foreign denominated liabilities, then an appreciation of 
the domestic currency should benefit it (i.e., the stock return should increase in response 
to a positive exchange rate movement).  
In order to check the robustness of our results to the use of a different source of 
exchange rate risk, we also perform the analysis using the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the euro (respectively the U.K. pound) instead of utilizing the trade-
weighted currency indices. While the trade-weighted exchange rate indices translate more 
effectively all the exchange rate uncertainties influencing European firms in their trading 
relationships with different countries, the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rates have the 
advantage of not being affected by the potential divergent off-setting effects between 
multiple currencies (Miller and Reuer, 1998). Results for both exchange risk factor 
specifications will be simultaneously presented in the rest of the paper. We will 
empirically verify that the choice of index doesn’t lead to major differences in the 
conclusions of our analysis. 
In consistence with Allayannis and Ofek (2001), we use a 3-year return period 
surrounding the year in which annual reports are collected to measure the 
                                                 
40
 Including the stock market return in Eq. (1) dramatically reduces the residual variances of the regression. 
Moreover, the market return implicitly controls for the value-relevant macroeconomic factors that are 
correlated with the exchange rates. It is, however, important to stress that according to Eq. (1), the 
empirical result of having zero exposure does not imply that the firm’s value is independent of exchange 
rates; rather, a zero firm-specific exposure implies that the firm value is affected to the same degree as the 
market portfolio.   
41
 The sign of the currency exposure becomes more ambiguous for a company that has importing as well as 
exporting activities. In this particular situation, the elasticity of the firm’s demand for foreign goods relative 
to the elasticity of the foreign market’s demand for the firm’s goods have to be taken into account (Adler 
and Dumas, 1984; He and Ng, 1998).  
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contemporaneous impact of FCD use on a firm’s exchange rate exposure.42 The 
regression estimates obtained using weekly data are presented in table 4. First, we note 
that the majority of our European sample firms are facing a negative currency exposure.43 
This implies that most companies are negatively affected by an appreciating domestic 
currency and behave like net-exporters. European firms are, moreover, found to be more 
exposed to the changes in the bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-à-vis their domestic 
currency than to the movements of their currency’s trade-weighted exchange rate index. 
Regarding both exchange risk factors, it appears that among FCD users a slightly higher 
percentage of firms is significantly affected by currency fluctuations than among FCD 
non-users. This doesn’t necessarily imply that firms use FCDs to speculate but may 
simply translate the observation made above that FCD users have stronger international 
linkages than companies that don’t use FCDs.44 The difference in market risk and foreign 
currency exposure between both groups of companies is specifically examined by testing 
the null hypothesis of equality of mean (median) exposure values between both sub-
samples. Results of these tests suggest that the average market beta of FCD users is 
statistically higher than the average market beta observed for FCD non-users. Regarding 
foreign currency exposure coefficients, it is interesting to note that FCD non-users show a 
statistically stronger negative mean exposure to fluctuations in the trade-weighted 
exchange rate index, whereas FCD users seem on average to be more strongly negatively 
affected by U.S. dollar movements.45 
The monthly results of the augmented market model regression (Eq. 1) are 
displayed in table 5. In line with previous results our findings show that exchange risk 
                                                 
42
 Following Allayannis and Ofek (2001) we check the robustness of our results to an alternative time 
interval – 2 years – surrounding the year in which the annual reports are collected. Overall the modification 
of the estimation period doesn’t affect the findings that are presented in this paper. Results are delivered 
from the authors upon request.   
43
 At first glance these results appear to be in contrast to previous findings reported in Muller and 
Verschoor (2004). We have to stress, however, that both estimations of European firms’ currency risk 
exposures have been performed on distinctive sample periods corresponding both to different economic 
episodes and to distinctive currency fluctuation patterns. The results presented in this paper provide hence 
further evidence in support of the time-varying behavior of exposure at the individual firm level that has 
already been empirically highlighted in Muller and Verschoor (2004). 
44
 As mentioned in table 1, the average ratio of foreign sales to total sales is twice as high for FCD users 
compared to FCD non-users. This large difference in foreign trading activity is expected to lead to a large 
difference in the percentage of firms with significant foreign currency exposure. As we can’t empirically 
verify this large difference in percentage of significantly exposed companies, we presume that this 
difference has been reduced through the implementation of financial hedging strategies by FCD users.  
45
 These findings are in contradiction with the information collected in annual reports, reporting that almost 
90 percent of companies use FCDs to hedge predominantly U.S. dollar currency fluctuations. 
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exposure becomes statistically more evident when increasing the observation horizon.46 
Approximately 42 percent (40 percent) of FCD hedgers (non-hedgers) appear to be 
significantly influenced by movements in the trade-weighted exchange rate index while 
roughly 62 percent (52 percent) are influenced by fluctuations in the U.S. dollar. Whereas 
FCD users as a group still count the higher percentage of firms with significant 
exposures, we observe nevertheless that non-users show consistently stronger negative 
mean and median exposures to movements in the trade-weighted exchange rate index. 
Finally, consistent with weekly results, most European sample firms appear to benefit 
from an appreciation of their home currency while being negatively affected by domestic 
currency depreciations. 
It is a common belief that exchange risk exposure is created via foreign operations 
and may be reduced through the implementation of financial hedging strategies. 
However, foreign exchange risk effects may also be reduced through alternative 
channels. As a great number of distinctive exchange rates may affect firm value through 
many different ways, all these influences may naturally offset each other. When 
analyzing the impact of FCD usage on firms’ foreign currency exposure, we therefore 
include firm size to proxy a firm’s international diversification possibilities as well as its 
capacity to implement operational hedging strategies The ratio of foreign sales is also 
incorporated in subsequent models in order to take a firm’s international involvement into 
account. As previous empirical evidence (Bodnar et al., 1998) suggests that among firms 
with foreign exchange exposure that regularly hedge, there seems to be a tendency to 
hedge only a small fraction of the total foreign currency exposure, we expect that the use 
of FCDs doesn’t completely offset the currency risk exposure firms are facing but we 
expect that it reduces its absolute value and statistical significance. We examine, hence, 
subsequently the link between FCD practices and the significance of firms’ exchange rate 
exposures as well as the relationship between these strategies and the magnitude of the 
exposures. 
Empirical findings regarding the impact of FCD use on the significance of foreign 
exchange risk exposure of European firms are presented in table 6. The dependent 
variable of the probit model is assigned the value 1 if the firm is statistically 
significantly47 affected by currency fluctuations and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the 
view that the percentage of foreign sales to total sales is a reasonable proxy for firms’ 
overall international trade linkages and hence their exposure to exchange rate uncertainty, 
                                                 
46
 See for instance Chow and Chen (1998), Griffin and Stulz (2001), Dominguez and Tesar (2001), Di Iorio 
and Faff (2001) and Muller and Verschoor (2004). 
47
 Reported results have been obtained with the 10 percent statistical significance level. However to test the 
robustness of these results, we performed the analysis as well with the 5 percent statistical significance 
level. Results are consistent and may be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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results suggest that the importance of foreign sales is the major determinant of the 
significance of firms’ currency exposure. The more companies are selling outside of their 
frontiers the more they seem to be significantly affected by exchange rate fluctuations. 
The size of a firm is also positively linked to the significance of its foreign exchange risk 
exposure. On the other hand, we find that firms’ decision to use FCDs has a negative 
effect on the significance of their sensitivity to exchange rates. This negative relationship 
supports the view that non-financial firms use FCDs primarily for hedging purposes – 
and not for speculation. It is however statistically insignificant. We thus may conclude 
that the implemented foreign currency hedging strategies are not able to efficiently 
reduce the exchange rate risk European companies are effectively facing. 
In order to further investigate the impact of FCD use on firms’ exchange risk 
exposure, we focus now on the relationship between the extent of FCD usage and the 
magnitude of the exposure. As mentioned above, the total exposure of a company should 
be smaller in magnitude when currency derivatives offset exchange rate effects from 
foreign operations. To empirically assess the relationship between FCD use and the 
magnitude of foreign exchange risk exposure we estimate the following model: 
 
Est.(i) = 1i + 2i ln(Sizei)+ 3i (FS/TS)i+ 4i (FCD/TA)i+ i        (2)  
 
where Est.(i) is a firm’s exchange risk exposure estimated in (Eq. 1), ln(Sizei) a firm’s 
size – measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of market value of equity and book 
value of debt –, (FS/TS)i a firm’s ratio of foreign sales to total sales and (FCD/TA)i a 
firm’s ratio of foreign currency derivatives to total assets.  
As the foreign operations of positively (net-importers) and negatively (net-
exporters) exposed firms are presumably completely different in nature, we examine 
these sub-samples of firms separately.  
In a first stage we estimate Eq. (2) using ordinary least squares The first 
regression outputs of panel A and B of table 7 show that while the link between foreign 
currency exposure and the level of FCD use has the expected sign, it is nonetheless again 
statistically insignificant.48 These findings confirm our view that the use of financial 
derivative instruments by European firms doesn’t significantly reduce their sensitivity to 
exchange rate movements. As expected, we find however that for net-importing 
companies – that are positively affected by currency movements – foreign sales tend to 
naturally offset the impact of exchange rate movements. Likewise, the exposure of net-
exporting firms appears to be strengthened through the existence of high foreign sales 
                                                 
48
 Corroborating results are provided in De Jong et al. (2004) who find little evidence to suggest that 
external hedging activities decrease currency risk exposure on the Dutch market 
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volumes. Finally, the positive (negative) relationship between firm size and negative 
(positive) exposure coefficients supports the argument that larger firms have greater 
access to international diversification benefits and operational hedging practices. 
Pantzalis et al. (2001) similarly conclude that firms with a greater breadth of foreign 
operations have lower foreign exchange rate exposure. 
Following Chow and Chen (1998) and Nguyen and Faff (2003) we examine next 
whether our results are robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that are 
considered in the literature as proxies for firms’ incentives to hedge:  
 
Est.(i) = 1i + 2i ln(Sizei)+ 3i (FS/TS)i+ 4i (FCD/TA)i+ 4i (Quick)i  
+ 4i (LT Debt / Size)i + 4i (BTM)i + i                (3)  
 
where Est.(i) is a firm’s exchange risk exposure estimated in Eq. (1), ln(Sizei) a firm’s 
size – measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of market value of equity and book 
value of debt –, (FS/TS)i a firm’s ratio of foreign sales to total sales, (FCD/TA)i a firm’s 
ratio of foreign currency derivatives to total assets, (Quick)i a firm’s quick ratio, (LT Debt 
/ Size)i a firm‘s ratio of long term debt to size and (BTM)i a firm’s book to market value.  
 Empirical findings of Eq. (3) are displayed in the second regression outputs of 
Panel A and B of table 7. We observe, in particular, that firms with high liquidity tend to 
be more exposed to currency movements. These results are in favor of Froot et al.’s 
(1993) argument that highly liquid firms have less incentive to hedge than firms that are 
facing strong liquidity constraints and are susceptible to be hurt by an increase in cash-
flow volatility. Further empirical findings tend to support the view that firms with high 
debt ratios and strong growth opportunities tend to be affected by currency movements. 
These relations aren’t however statistically significant. 
Table 8 presents the coefficient estimates of Eq. (2) and (3) when weighted least squares 
are used. The weighting factors are the t-statistics of the exposure coefficients estimated 
by model (Eq. 1). This enables us to assign more weight to the exposure coefficients that 
have been estimated with higher precision and less to those estimated with lower 
precision. Results confirm previous findings but are generally statistically stronger 
compared to those obtained using ordinary least squares. Again we find that the extent of 
FCD use tends to reduce a firm’s exposure to exchange rate risk. However this impact 
remains statistically weak. On the other hand, we observe once more that foreign sales 
significantly accentuate the exposure net exporters are facing while they tend to reduce 
the currency sensitivity of net-importers. The confirmation of the negative link between 
exchange rate exposure magnitude and firm size supports the argument that firm size is a 
proxy for a firm’s ability to diversify international operations and implement operational 
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hedging strategies (Bodnar et al., 1997). The inclusion of variables that approximate 
firms’ incentives to hedge enables us to emphasize two additional features. In line with 
previous results, the liquidity of a firm is shown to be statistically positively linked to the 
magnitude of foreign currency exposure. Secondly, the weighted least squares regressions 
lead to strong evidence in favor of a positive relationship between leverage and exposure 
magnitude. The impact of the existence of growth opportunities has again the expected 
sign but remains statistically insignificant. 
It is important to stress that the aforementioned probit, ordinary least squares and 
weighted least squares estimations almost unanimously disprove the assumption that 
financial hedging instruments have a stronger impact on weekly compared to monthly 
currency risk exposures. Two potential reasons may explain why currency exposure 
effects become more evident when lengthening the observation horizon: managers’ 
stronger capacity to implement short-term hedging strategies and investors’ short-term 
mispricing errors. Empirical evidence presented in tables 6, 7 and 8 reveals that one of 
these hypotheses has to be rejected: managers have no incremental knowledge of their 
weekly versus monthly exposures to currency fluctuations and are hence not able to 
hedge these short-term risks in a more efficient way. Consequently, empirical evidence 
suggesting that currency exposure effects are statistically stronger when they are 
estimated over longer return intervals should be predominantly attributed to the fact that 
it is difficult for investors to differentiate between temporary versus permanent currency 
shocks and, hence, to predict the impact of short-term exchange rate shocks on a firm’s 
competitive and economic environment (Bodnar and Wong, 2003; Chow et al., 1997a, 
1997b; Di Iorio and Faff, 2000).  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the foreign exchange risk practices of European non-financial 
companies. In a first stage, we are concerned with the motives that lead firms to use 
currency derivatives as well as the factors that affect their decision on how much to 
hedge with these instruments. In a second stage, the extent to which this usage affects 
their foreign exchange risk exposure is thoroughly investigated. The major contribution 
of this paper is that it provides a unique insight in European firms’ hedging strategies as 
well as an in-depth analysis of the real impacts of these hedging strategies on firms’ risk 
exposures. 
 Consistent with previous studies, the main determinants of FCD use are found to 
be the percentage of firms’ foreign trading volumes and size. While these results seem to 
refute the financial distress costs and informational asymmetries motives to hedge, they 
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provide evidence in favor of the existence of economies of scale in hedging. When the 
firm is larger and the volume of foreign activity is sufficiently large to justify the costs, 
the implementation of hedging programs appears to be strongly facilitated. Further, our 
results lend support to the argument that the existence and extent of tax loss 
carryforwards play a significant role in explaining firms’ use of financial derivative 
instruments. The positive relationship between the percentage of foreign denominated 
debt and the use of FCDs reveals moreover that both types of instruments are 
complements in hedging foreign currency risk. Finally, in contrast to optimal hedging 
theories (Froot et al., 1993), our empirical findings suggest that the more growth 
opportunities companies have, the less they use FCDs. 
In a second stage, we investigate the role of FCD usage in influencing the 
significance and magnitude of firms’ sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations. The 
relationship between firm value and currency movements has been documented both for 
weekly and monthly observation horizons to examine the effect of FCDs on both the 
short- and medium-term currency exposures of European firms. Overall, most European 
companies in our sample are found to behave like net-exporters – being negatively 
affected by a depreciation of foreign currencies. Empirical evidence reveals as well that 
the impact of exchange rate changes on firm value becomes more evident when 
lengthening the observation horizon. 
Our empirical results lend strong support to the hypothesis that the degree of 
international involvement – approximated by the percentage of foreign sales – is a major 
determinant of firms’ currency risk exposure. Size, on the other hand, appears to be 
negatively related to exchange rate exposure. The negative role of size tends to support 
the argument that larger firms benefit from the diversification of their foreign operations 
and are to a greater extent capable of implementing operational hedging strategies. 
Furthermore, firms with high liquidity ratios and firms with high growth opportunities 
and leverage appear to be more sensitive to currency fluctuations. These findings are 
informative since they show that companies that use liquidity as a substitute for hedging 
as well as companies that are particularly vulnerable to cash-flow-volatility tend to be 
particularly affected by exchange rate movements. Ultimately, our evidence supports 
unanimously the assumption that European companies use FCDs not to speculate on the 
foreign exchange markets but to protect themselves against currency fluctuations. 
However these hedging strategies are shown to have statistically weak effects. Similarly, 
no conclusive evidence could be found to corroborate managers’ stronger capacity to 
hedge the short-term versus long-term currency exposure of the company.. 
It is important to note that when investigating the relation between the utilization 
of FCDs and firms’ currency exposure, our empirical findings are shown to be robust to 
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the use of a wide range of alternative specifications. Results lead to the same conclusions 
when a different exchange risk factor or a shorter sample period is utilized for the 
estimation of firms’ exposure to currency movements. Findings are likewise found to be 
robust to the use of different estimation methodologies (e.g., ordinary least squares, 
weighted least squares and probit regressions).  
Our results have strong implications for managers, investors and regulators. They 
may be interpreted as further evidence that managers are using FCDs to hedge only a 
small proportion of the currency risk they are facing and that these hedging activities are 
mostly unsystematic. Additionally, the fact that the relationship between currency 
movements and firm value is statistically and economically weaker in the short-run – as 
compared to the long-run – may not be attributed to managers’ stronger capacity to hedge 
short-term versus long-term currency exposure. It reveals, in reality, that short-term 
returns contain errors made by investors in forecasting the long-term effects of current 
exchange rate fluctuations.  
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Table 1: Sample description 
Panel A: Belgian, German and Dutch firms
Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.
Size† (in mio Euros) 223 18.800 873 135.000 112 505 209 778
Total assets (in mio Euros) 223 8.280 700 26.000 112 386 134 557
Employees 223 25.530 4.167 62.407 112 2.710 852 4.484
Book to market value 223 0,8649 0,8915 0,3823 112 0,7593 0,7767 0,3058
Debt ratio‡ 223 0,1661 0,1299 0,1549 112 0,1175 0,0682 0,1518
Quick ratio 223 0,4371 0,2228 0,7235 112 1,9357 0,1577 8,2593
Dividend yield 223 0,0196 0,0173 0,0202 112 0,0158 0,0117 0,0187
EBIT / Total asets 223 0,0099 0,0379 0,1268 112 0,0001 0,0281 0,3863
Foreign sales§ / Total sales 187 0,3574 0,3600 0,2126 83 0,1449 0,0600 0,2025
Foreign float debt / Total assets 61 0,0093 0,0000 0,0211 33 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Foreign fixed debt / Total assets 61 0,0542 0,0083 0,0916 33 0,0060 0,0000 0,0173
Panel B: UK firms
Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. Obs.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.
Size† (in mio UK pounds) 133 8.450 1.710 47.700 3 367 428 161
Total assets (in mio UK pounds) 133 16.700 1.680 103.000 3 294 335 149
Employees 131 19.700 11.123 22.575 3 1.103 988 735
Book to market value 133 0,9710 0,9419 0,4284 3 0,7870 0,6969 0,1660
Debt ratio‡ 133 0,2123 0,1892 0,1670 3 0,0595 0,0291 0,0630
Quick ratio 133 0,0633 0,0092 0,2662 3 0,0099 0,0099 0,0010
Dividend yield 133 0,0297 0,0321 0,0185 3 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
EBIT / Total asets 133 0,0358 0,0403 0,0687 3 0,0634 0,0974 0,0821
Foreign sales§§ / Total sales 133 0,6065 0,6902 0,2709 3 0,2991 0,2991 0,3614
Foreign float debt / Total assets 131 0,0883 0,0723 0,0844 3 0,0440 0,0000 0,0762
Foreign fixed debt / Total assets 131 0,0878 0,0357 0,1083 3 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
FCD Users FCD Non-Users
FCD Non-UsersFCD Users
The total sample of 335 Belgian, German and Dutch firms as well as the sample of 136 U.K. firms is 
subdivided between FCD users and FCD non-users. Reported data are obtained of the 2003 annual reports. 
†
 Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. 
‡ Leverage is defined as the ratio of long term debt to total assets. 
§
 Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and Gerrnan companies are sales to non-Euro zone countries (Sales to 
non-Euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). 
§§
 Foreign sales for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. 
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Table 2: Factors explaining the decision to use FCDs 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept  -9.4991***  -8.2269***  -9.6051***   -8.3984***  -10.5028*  -9.4717***
-5,0271 -4,2322 -4,0418 -3,3699 -1,7487 -2,9850
Foreign Salesa / Total Sales  3.1412***  3.2397*** 3.6836*** 5.0068***
5,9489 4,8820 4,7586 3,4104
Ln (Sizeb)  0.4131*** 0.3591** 0.4017*** 0.4096*** 0.5108* 0.3470**
4,4191 3,6626 3,5005 3,2461 1,6773 2,1564
Long term debt / Sizeb 0,9497 0,7980 0,9826 3.8166*
1,1166 0,3568 0,9143 1,8783
Quick ratio 0,2710 0,4887 -0,0183 0,5763 0,4981
1,1679 1,4197 -0,4268 0,9540 0,7043
EBIT / Interest Expenses 0,0013
0,3757
Market to Book Value 0,5747 0,4975 0,7709 -0,0214 0,7416 0,6033
1,4587 1,1774 1,5971 -0,0401 0,9064 0,8194
Dividend Yield 10.8939* 8,2903 8,5212 15,8340 30,0315 23.9608*
1,7036 1,1739 1,1019 1,5357 1,4490 1,7274
Tax convexityc 0.5129** 0,3975 0,3675  0.6198* 0,2166 0.8533*
2,1805 1,3368 1,1602 1,7278 0,4071 1,8461
EBIT / Total Assets -0,4481 -0,6355
-0,8101 -0,7386
Ln (# of analysts) 0,3052
1,0541
Managerial optionsd 12,3101
0,6971
Foreign debt / Sizeb 13.3336*** 15.6878** 6.3932e
3,1456 2,3205 1,2697
Observations 406 406 204 228 142 228
Likelihood -31,5416 -57,7185 -47,6440 -47,0471 -18,3864 -30,8849
Mc-Fadden R2 45,42% 45,53% 49,05% 47,40% 52,48% 57,89%
Dependent variable: Use FCD = 1 otherwise = 0
 
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm hedges 
foreign currency exposure with FCDs and proxies for incentives to hedge respectively proxies for 
complement or substitute hedging activities. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. 
a
 Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and Gerrnan companies are sales to non-Euro zone countries (Sales to 
non-Euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales 
for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. 
b
 Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. 
c
 Tax convexity is measured by a dummy variable that is assigned the value 0 if the firm has tax loss 
carryforwards and 0 otherwise.  
d
 Managerial options are calculated as the ratio of CEO’s option holdings multiplied by the year-end price 
of the firm share to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt.  
e
 In model 6 the ratio foreign debt to size is replaced by the residuals of the regression of the ratio of 
foreign debt to size against the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and size. 
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Table 3: Factors explaining the level of FCD use 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept  -0.1778* -0,1604 -0,1908 -0,1442 -0,1539 -0,2066
-1,6751 -1,2809 -1,4096 -1,0052 -0,7731 -1,2398
Foreign Salesa / Total Sales 0.0644** 0.0696** 0,0557 0,0476
2,0980 2,0154 1,5291 1,1720
Ln (Sizeb) 0.0124** 0.0123* 0.0125*  0.0115* 0,0101 0,0131
2,3347 1,9377 1,8779 1,7289 1,0050 1,5298
Long term debt / Sizeb 0,0799 0,0475 0,0757 0,1038
1,2958 0,7113 1,0443 1,3704
Quick ratio -0,0100 -0,0169 -0,0002  -0.0875**  -0.0705*
-0,5642 -0,8289 -1,1047 -2,1295 -1,6772
EBIT / Interest Expenses -0,0003
-1,3369
Market to Book Value  0.0519**  0.0649** 0.0541** 0,0450 0,0398 0,0509
2,0616 2,4163 1,9646 1,6157 1,3799 1,6007
Dividend Yield -0,3012 -0,1432 0,0684 -0,1411 0,0922 -0,0301
-0,6748 -0,2931 0,1321 -0,2408 0,1375 -0,0334
Tax convexityc 0.3068** 0.4751*** 0.5911*** 0.7193*** 1.0373*** 0.6547**
2,1102 2,6081 2,9675 3,0626 3,7133 2,4633
EBIT / Total Assets  -0.0909*  -0.1455**
-1,9313 -2,4556
Ln (# of analysts) 0,0033
0,1910
Managerial optionsd 1,3548
0,9623
Foreign debt / Sizeb 0.1474** 0.2248*** 0.1838* f
1,9974 2,7895 1,7439
Observations 290 290 204 192 142 192
Likelihood 157,26890 120,3224 109,92560 111,55780 86,72860 88,34760
Adjusted R2 6,27% 8,24% 7,24% 6,31% 11,78% 7,46%
Dependent variable: FCDe / Total Assets
 
This table presents OLS regression estimates of the relation between the extent of utilization of FCDs and 
proxies for incentives to hedge respectively proxies for complement or substitute hedging activities. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. 
a
 Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and Gerrnan companies are sales to non-Euro zone countries (Sales to 
non-Euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales 
for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. 
b
 Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. 
c
 Tax convexity is measured by the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to total assets.  
d
 Managerial options are calculated as the ratio of CEO’s option holdings multiplied by the year-end price 
of the firm share to the sum of the market value of equity and book value of debt.  
e
 FCD usage is approximated by the total notional value of foreign currency derivative contracts. 
f
 In model 6 the ratio foreign debt to size is replaced by the residuals of the regression of the ratio of foreign 
debt to size against the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and size. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for FX exposure coefficients estimated using weekly 
data 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.
Panel A: Exposure to the trade-weighted exchange rate index
Intercept -0,0007 0,0004 0,0056 -0,0005 0,0003 0,0063
European Stock Market 0,8865 0,7534 0,6227 0,7597 0,6841 0,5498
TW Exchange Rate Index -0,9676 -0,7054 1,1674 -1,1839 -1,0448 1,0969
# of positive / negative FX exposures 291 / 66 105 / 11
% of significant FX exposures 38,10% 38,79%
Test for the difference in market risk between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 1.9588* 0,0507
Equality of median 1,0868 0,2972
Test for the difference in FX exposure between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 1.7589* 0,0792
Equality of median 5.4056** 0,0201
Panel B: Exposure to the bilateral US dollar exchange rate
Intercept 0,0000 0,0009 0,0054 -0,0001 0,0006 0,0065
European Stock Market 0,9635 0,8284 0,6795 0,8037 0,6904 0,5866
US$ Exchange rate -0,8208 -0,7182 0,6384 -0,6841 -0,6484 0,5968
# of positive / negative FX exposures 333 / 24 24,00000 109 / 7
% of significant FX exposures 54,19% 43,97%
Test for the difference in market risk between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 2.2722** 0,0235
Equality of median 1,0866 0,2970
Test for the difference in FX exposure between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 2.0359** 0,0423
Equality of median 3.0143* 0,0825
FCD Non-UsersFCD Users
 
This table reports cross-sectional summary statistics of the parameters estimated from the following 
regression model for the period from January 2002 to October 2004 using maximum likelihood: 
Rit = i + i Rmt + i t + it                            
with   it = it *(hit)1/2 hit= i + 	i 2i,t-1 + νi hi,t-1        
where Rit designates the total return of firm i in period t, Rmt the Datastream calculated European total stock 
market return in period t, i firm i’s return sensitivity to market fluctuations, t the movement in the trade-
weighted euro (U.K. pound) exchange rate index – Panel A –, respectively the movement in the bilateral 
euro (U.K. pound) / U.S. dollar exchange rate – Panel B –, i firm i’s exposure to these exchange rate 
movements, hi,t denotes the conditional variance of the residuals;  i, 	i and νi unknown parameters; and i,t 
represents the white noise error term. The GARCH (1, 1) specification is added to Eq. (1) to take the 
heteroskedasticity of weekly returns into account.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. 
†
 The equality of mean hypothesis is tested using a t-test verifying whether the variability between the 
sample means (between groups) is the same as the variability within any subgroup. 
‡ The equality of median hypothesis is tested using a Ch-squared rank-based ANOVA test based on the 
comparison of the number of observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for FX exposure coefficients estimated using monthly 
data 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.
Panel A: Exposure to the trade-weighted exchange rate index
Intercept -0,0034 -0,0011 0,0219 -0,0010 0,0018 0,0306
European Stock Market 1,1881 0,9869 0,8436 1,1232 1,0112 0,8905
TW Exchange Rate Index -1,6125 -1,0314 2,1126 -2,2561 -1,5550 2,3371
# of positive / negative FX exposures 295 / 63 102 / 14
% of significant FX exposures 42,18% 39,66%
Test for the difference in market risk between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 0,7072 0,4798
Equality of median 0,0576 0,8104
Test for the difference in FX exposure between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 2.7768*** 0,0057
Equality of median 10.2726*** 0,0014
Panel B: Exposure to the bilateral US dollar exchange rate
Intercept 0,0004 0,0023 0,0211 0,0003 0,0027 0,0312
European Stock Market 1,2332 1,0089 0,8492 1,1311 1,0307 0,9274
US$ Exchange rate -1,1762 -1,0035 0,9654 -1,1295 -0,9478 1,1540
# of positive / negative FX exposures 334 / 24 102 / 14
% of significant FX exposures 61,90% 52,59%
Test for the difference in market risk between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 1,0969 0,2733
Equality of median 0,2058 0,6500
Test for the difference in FX exposure between FCD Users (356 firms) and FCD Non-Users (115 firms)
Equality of mean 0,4303 0,6672
Equality of median 0,1826 0,6691
FCD Users FCD Non-Users
This table reports cross-sectional summary statistics of the parameters estimated from the following 
regression model for the period from January 2002 to October 2004 using ordinary least squares: 
Rit = i + i Rmt + i t + it                              
where Rit designates the total return of firm i in period t, Rmt the Datastream calculated European total stock 
market return in period t, i firm i’s return sensitivity to market fluctuations, t the movement in the trade-
weighted euro (U.K. pound) exchange rate index – Panel A –, respectively the movement in the bilateral 
euro (U.K. pound) / U.S. dollar exchange rate – Panel B –, i firm i’s exposure to these exchange rate 
movements and i,t represents the white noise error term. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. 
†
 The equality of mean hypothesis is tested using a t-test verifying whether the variability between the 
sample means (between groups) is the same as the variability within any subgroup. 
‡ The equality of median hypothesis is tested using a Ch-squared rank-based ANOVA test based on the 
comparison of the number of observations above and below the overall median in each subgroup. 
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Table 6: FX exposure and the use of FCDs (Probit) 
Intercept -0,7000 (-0.9864)  -1.4153** (-2.0054)  -1.5994** (-2.1418) -0,5728 (-0.8258)
ln (Size†) 0,0346 (0.9465) 0.0736** (2.0291) 0.0786** (2.0400) 0,0423 (1.2262)
Foreign Sales§ / Total Sales 0.7341*** (2.8321) 0.8634** (3.3050)  0.6699** (2.4502) 0,1136 (0.4764)
FCD usage dummy‡ -0,1912 (1.0377) -0,1112 (-0.6053) -0,2113 (-1.1309) -0,4591 (-1.2698)
Observations 406 406 406 406
Mac Fadden R2 0,0166 0,0269 0,0477 0,0075
Intercept -0,8624 (-1.2346)  -1.3979** (-2.0106)  -1.8327** (-2.4897) -0,2765 (-0.3905)
ln (Size†) 0,0462 (1.3343) 0.0759** (2.1989) 0.0958*** (2.6141) 0,0150 (0.4111)
Foreign Sales§ / Total Sales  0.6291*** (2.6119) 0.7763*** (3.2196) 0.7948*** (3.1398) 0,1671 (0.6433)
FCD usage dummy‡ -1,4627 (1.4198) -0,9924 (-1.0373) -0,3016 (-0.3401)  -1.1484** (-1.2698)
Observations 406 406 406 406
Mac Fadden R2 0,0186 0,0261 0,0466 0,0166
Exposure to TW index Exposure to US$
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly
This table presents logit regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm is 
significantly exposed to currency exposure and firm size, the percentage of foreign sales to total sales and 
the use – or not – of foreign currency derivatives. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. 
†
 Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. 
‡ The FCD usage dummy variable is assigned the value 1 if the firm reports the use of foreign currency 
derivatives in the notes to their annual reports and 0 otherwise. 
§
 Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-Euro zone countries (Sales to 
non-Euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales 
for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. 
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Table 7: FX exposure and the use of FCDs (Ordinary Least Squares) 
Panel A: Dependent variable : exposure to the trade-weighted exchange rate index
Intercept  -1.5177** -2.3943  -5.5918*** -4,7477 0.9108* 1.8783 1,7572 1,3501
ln (Size†) 0,0056 0.1784 0.1471** 2,5178 -0,0269 -1.1099 -0,0462 -0,7120
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales -0,3537 -1.5935  -0.7005* 1,6731 0,0139 0.0943 0,1046 0,2399
FCD§ / Total Assets 0,3171 0.3944 1,4466 0,8779 -0,2512 -0.4045 -0,6397 -0,4967
Observations 235 241 55 49
Adjusted R2 0,0000 0,0308 0,0000 0,0000
Intercept  -3.2796*** -4.2907  -5.2717*** -3.7239 1.3645*** 2.7148 3.8716** 2.4375
ln (Size†) 0.0933** 2.4255 0,1146 1.6372  -0.0574** -2.1955  -0.1790** -2.1447
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales -0,1736 -0.7451  -0.8879** -1.9049 0,1588 1.0258  -1.5444*** -3.4534
FCD§ / Total Assets 0,4783 0.6200 1,3740 0.8345 -0,2485 -0.4114 -0,1184 -0.1028
Quick Ratio 0,0166 0.5781  -0.5779*** -3.1436 0.5107** 2.5726 0,0421 1.5683
LT Debt / Size† -0,2939 -0.5875 -0,7138 -0.7911 0,3708 1.5413 0,9573 1.1784
Market to Book Value 0,1746 0.9052 0,4261 1.2399 -0,0233 -0.2658 -0,0412 -0.1244
Observations 235 241 55 49
Adjusted R2 0,0145 0,0875 0,0594 0,2884
Panel B: Dependent variable : exposure to the bilateral US dollar exchange rate
Intercept -0,3672 -1,0556  -2.4222*** -4.2547 0,7793 0.9776 2.7063** 2.5007
ln (Size†) -0,1912 -1,1103 0.0538* 1.9066 -0,0349 -0.8747  -0.1125** -2.0848
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales  -0.3369*** -2,7654 -0,1109 -0.5481  -0.7978*** -3.2979  -1.6278*** -4.4912
FCD§ / Total Assets 0,1996 0,4523 1,2663 1.5901 0,1876 0.1837 -0,2018 -0.1885
Observations 265 259 25 31
Adjusted R2 0,0241 0,0094 0,1931 0,3008
Intercept  -1.3247*** -3.1513  -2.1221*** -3.0793 1,3566 1.6675 3.8716** 2.4375
ln (Size†) 0,0328 1.5537 0,0317 0.9305  -0.0715* -1.6890  -0.1790** -2.1447
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales  -0.4813*** -3.7551 -0,0174 -0.0800  -0.5343** -2.1322  -1.5444*** -3.4534
FCD§ / Total Assets 0,1698 0.4003 1,2773 1.5935 0,3285 0.3360 -0,1184 -0.1028
Quick Ratio -0,0246 -1.5514  -0.1908** -2.1325 0.9098*** 2.8311 0,0421 1.5683
LT Debt / Size† -0,2665 -0.9688 -0,4726 -1.0758 0,3223 0.8277 0,9573 1.1784
Market to Book Value 0,0053 0.0499 0,1144 0.6838 -0,1426 -1.0055 -0,0412 -0.1244
Observations 265 259 25 31
Adjusted R2 0,0431 0,0315 0,2647 0,2884
Negative exposures Positive exposures
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly
 
This table presents OLS regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm is 
significantly exposed to currency exposure and firm size, the percentage of foreign sales to total sales and 
the extent of FCD usage. The second OLS regression outputs reports results when liquidity, leverage and 
market to book value are included in the estimation model. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-statistics are in italics. 
†
 Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. 
§ FCD usage is approximated by the total notional value of foreign currency derivative contracts. 
‡
 Foreign sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-Euro zone countries (Sales to 
non-Euro zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales 
for U.K. companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. 
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Table 8: FX exposure and the use of FCDs (Weighted Least Squares) 
Panel A: Dependent variable : exposure to the trade-weighted exchange rate index
Intercept  -2.3718*** -4.2913  -7.0573***  -6.1702 0.8385* 1.9092 3.2159* 1.7421
ln (Size†) 0,0059 0.2207 0.1789*** 3.1917 -0,0186 -0.8678 -0,0877 -0.8975
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales -0,4219 -1.5758  -1.6212*** -3.3673 0.5231*** 3.5158 0,6557 1.0311
FCD§ / Total Assets 1,0770 1.4992 3.5836* 1.8232 -0,4869 -0.6717 -1,9450 -0.8685
Observations 235 241 55 49
Adjusted R2 0,7203 0,6487 0,8042 0,5539
Intercept  -4.1883*** -5.6431  -8.4346*** -5.5684 1.0481* 1.9168 2.8231* 1.8089
ln (Size†) 0.0961** 2.5374 0.2088*** 2.9197 -0,0305 -1.0946 -0,1150 -1.4203
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales
 -0.6820** -2.3788  -1.1783** -2.2195 0.6009*** 3.9063 -0,5113 -1.0014
FCD§ / Total Assets 0,6614 1.0333 3.8114** 1.9466 -0,4677 -0.6686  -2.6624* -1.7422
Quick Ratio -0,1056 -1.3111 -0,3193 -1.6052 0.3055** 2.3650 0.0425** 3.2843
LT Debt / Size† -0,5405 -0.8915 -0,2530 -0.2087 -0,1504 -0.5712 7.9375*** 8.9104
Market to Book Value 0,2927 1.1350 0,8409 1.8994 -0,0144 -0.1367 -0,1821 -0.5378
Observations 235 241 55 49
Adjusted R2 0,7422 0,6649 0,8232 0,8221
Panel B: Dependent variable : exposure to the bilateral US dollar exchange rate
Intercept  -1.6322*** -4.5357  -3.1114*** -4.2941 1,1034 0.0761 8.3768*** 5.9809
ln (Size†) 0,0071 0.4052 0.0542* 1,8936 -0,0049 -0.0762  -0.3479*** -4.9230
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales 0,0613 0.4312 0,0503 0,2282  -1.5779*** -5.1561  -3.3949*** -6.3221
FCD§ / Total Assets 0,6642 1.1314 2.2253* 1,8987 -1,1347 -0.5245 -1,6748 -0.3787
Observations 265 259 25 31
Adjusted R2 0,7069 0,6257 0,7855 0,6667
Intercept  -3.0451*** -6.5161  -3.2684*** -4,2941 -0,5342 -0.4034 9.5093*** 5,1509
ln (Size†) 0.0842*** 3.5371 0,0458 1.2688 0,0201 0.3115  -0.4334*** -4,2877
Foreign Sales‡ / Total Sales -0,0853 -0.5480 0,2021 0.8467  -1.1665*** -3.9646  -3.1315*** -5,1104
FCD§ / Total Assets 0,4451 0.9302 2.5070** 2.1251 -2,2540 -1.0558 -1,2810 -0,2910
Quick Ratio -0,0246 -0.4035 -0,0775 -0.7505 1.4178*** 3.4290 0.0403* 1,7941
LT Debt / Size†  -1.2737*** -3.5608 0,6846 1.1308 0,5628 1.4732 2.0255** 2,5238
Market to Book Value 0,1522 1.0581 0,2390 1.1501 -0,1289 -0.7448 -0,0205 -0,0680
Observations 265 259 25 31
Adjusted R2 0,7261 0,6295 0,8327 0,7098
Negative exposures Positive exposures
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly
This table presents WLS regression estimates of the relation between the likelihood that a firm is 
significantly exposed to currency exposure and firm size, the percentage of foreign sales to total sales and 
the extent of FCD usage. The second OLS regression outputs reports results when liquidity, leverage and 
market to book value are included in the estimation model. The weighting factors are the t-statistics of the 
exposure coefficients. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-
statistics are in italics. † Size is measured as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt. 
§ FCD usage is approximated by the total notional value of foreign currency derivative contracts. ‡ Foreign 
sales for Belgian, Dutch and German companies are sales to non-Euro zone countries (Sales to non-Euro 
zone countries are sometimes approximated by sales to non-European countries). Foreign sales for U.K. 
companies are sales to non-U.K. countries. 
